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Political Science 2010 62: 62

DOI: 10.1177/0032318710370466

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Rethinking cultural diplomacy: The cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, the Canadian Federation and Quebec¹

Political Science
62(1) 62–83
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DOI: 10.1177/0032318710370466
pnz.sagepub.com


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Abstract

Cultural diplomacy, the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy, has not attracted the level of scholarly attention it warrants, given its long history, the substantial investment by some practitioners, and its relevance to a number of related subjects in International Relations. As a result of this neglect there is little agreement on what the concept means; and several aspects of the practice warrant explication. Following a brief discussion of the core elements of the practice, including how it relates to other seemingly synonymous practices such as public diplomacy, international cultural relations and propaganda, I set out to discuss aspects of the recent cultural diplomacy of the Canadian Federation, Quebec and New Zealand in order to examine three underexplored aspects of the practice: cultural diplomacy's role in presenting a national image and its connection to nation branding, the practice's role in supporting the protection of cultural sovereignty, and its contribution to national domestic objectives.

Keywords

Canada, cultural diplomacy, national branding, New Zealand, Quebec

Cultural diplomacy has attracted comparatively little scholarly attention, despite its long history and the practice's intersection with a range of well-studied subjects,

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¹ The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Zealand government or any other organization.

such as diplomacy and national identity. The discipline of International Relations has almost entirely ignored cultural diplomacy and even dedicated studies of diplomacy have paid little attention to it. Cultural diplomacy has been dismissed as a lesser tool of diplomacy, a 'minor cog in the gearbox of foreign policy'.² Many diplomats may support cultural diplomacy in principle, but in practice they tend to place it at the lower end of their work priorities. This low priority is compounded by the difficulty in determining cultural diplomacy's long-term impact on the behaviour of audiences, something that has had an influence on the level of funding the practice can attract. The focus of scholars now tends more towards the related subjects of 'public diplomacy' and nation branding. Cultural diplomacy seems to have missed the bus: it is just a small part of the more fashionable 'public diplomacy', itself a practice now regarded by foreign services the world over as an essential element of their work.³

The lack of scholarly attention to cultural diplomacy may also be due to the lack of clarity about what precisely the practice entails. There is no one agreed definition of cultural diplomacy. Different terms, such as public diplomacy,⁴ international cultural relations, international cultural policy and a state's foreign cultural mission, are used as synonyms for cultural diplomacy.⁵ There is no general agreement among scholars about cultural diplomacy's relationship to the practice of diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is frequently viewed as a subset of diplomacy and of public diplomacy, but with little explanation given as to why this is so. Nor is there agreement about cultural diplomacy's objectives, practitioners, activities, timeframe or whether the practice is reciprocal or not. For some, cultural diplomacy is viewed as a practice which is undertaken in order to achieve normative, idealistic goals, to enhance 'mutual understanding',⁶ but others stress

2 Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 1; Riordan notes that cultural promotion 'is not regarded as a serious part of diplomacy'. Shaun Riordan, *The New Diplomacy: Themes for the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 121.

3 In 2003, in an interview with the author, the head of the British Council in India described the Council's work as public diplomacy, with cultural diplomacy being only a small part of it. Edmund Marsden, interview by the author, Delhi, 2003.

4 For instance Fox, although his is contextualized by a discussion on the confusion around terminology. Robert Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Cultural Relations in Europe and the Wider World* (London: British Council, 1999), p. 3.

5 As Wyszomirski notes, in practice the French term 'diplomatie culturelle' equates to international cultural relations in Australia, Canada, Singapore and the UK, and international cultural policy in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. Margaret Wyszomirski, *International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison* (Washington, DC: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003). Fox suggests that much of the difficulty in defining what cultural diplomacy 'is and should be lies in the terms "Diplomacy" and "Culture" and their semantic baggage'. Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads*, p. 2. In Lending's view, the varying terminology used by countries undertaking cultural diplomacy reveals 'major semantic differences'. Mette Lending, *Change and Renewal. Norwegian Foreign Cultural Policy 2001–2005* (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

6 For instance Milton C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey* (Washington, DC: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 1.

instrumental objectives.⁷ For Mitchell, the practitioner is the key: independent agencies undertake international cultural relations, governments undertake cultural diplomacy.⁸ For others, cultural diplomacy is that part of public diplomacy concerned with the building of long-term relationships.⁹ Some focus on the type of cultural activity that distinguishes cultural diplomacy from related practices (for instance, sports diplomacy involves sport and is therefore not *cultural* diplomacy). In almost all cases, little explanation is given about the location of the boundaries.

This lack of scholarly attention has meant that several aspects of cultural diplomacy have remained under-studied and poorly explicated. Little focus has been given to the role that cultural diplomacy plays in presenting a national image and its connection to nation branding, despite clear indications that this role has become an important part of the practice in recent years. Similarly, few studies have sought to examine cultural diplomacy's role in the protection of cultural sovereignty, and its contribution to national domestic objectives. These three aspects are examined below by drawing on elements of the cultural diplomacy of the Canadian Federation, Quebec and New Zealand.

It is useful to begin by setting out briefly the core characteristics of the practice. Simply stated, cultural diplomacy is 'the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy'.¹⁰ It is a diplomatic practice of governments – mostly single governments, but also groups of governments such as the European Union, and sub-national governments.¹¹ Cultural diplomacy is carried out in support of a government's foreign policy goals or its diplomacy, or both. It usually involves

7 New Zealand's Ministry for Culture and Heritage focuses more on the practice's contribution to advancing national interests, rather than enhancing mutual understanding. Ministry for Culture and Heritage, *The Place of Culture in New Zealand's International Relations* (Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2000), p. 4. See also Juliete Sablosky, *Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy: 1993–2002* (Washington DC: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 2.

8 J. M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 5.

9 Sablosky notes that 'cultural diplomacy's emphasis is on long-term interchange among nations'. Sablosky, *Recent Trends*, p. 2.

10 A less simple definition of the practice would include the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements: those entered into by authorities to regulate, encourage and facilitate cultural exchange and the newer form of cultural agreement which concerns how economic relations with a cultural aspect to them should be managed.

11 States such as the provinces of Canada and Germany, and the states of the US and Australia, can be regarded as agents of diplomacy and as practitioners of cultural diplomacy. Wiseman notes that 'in the Westphalian sense, only states are thought to conduct diplomacy'. Sub-national polities, whilst lacking the full array of diplomatic recognition and privileges, do nevertheless sit comfortably within Wiseman's notion that diplomacy consists of 'certain norms and values (the desirability of continuous dialogue through mutual recognition and representation); certain institutions (foreign ministries, embassies); certain processes (accreditation, a written code of diplomatic communications); and certain individuals (foreign ministry officials, ambassadors, and other diplomats)'. Geoffrey Wiseman, 'Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture', *International Studies Perspectives*, No. 6 (2005), pp. 409–30.

directly or indirectly a government's foreign ministry, or, at sub-national level, the ministry of international relations (for example, in Quebec). Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes – not only idealistic objectives such as enhancing mutual understanding or combating stereotyping,¹² but also for more functional objectives such as advancing a broad range of national interests.¹³ Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy's scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the polity the government represents, such as cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions, conferences, scholarships and visits, and establishing and maintaining professorships and chairs in universities abroad.¹⁴ In the past, cultural diplomacy was about showing a state's 'high culture' – the cultural expressions of the intellectual elites – but recently this has changed, with more focus now on 'popular culture' – cultural activities that attract mass audiences – and, for some states, attracting members of a national diaspora.¹⁵ Cultural diplomacy also incorporates supporting manifestations of another country's cultural activity at home, as this may help advance the national interests of the sending state.

Cultural diplomacy is not a synonym for public diplomacy, nor for international cultural relations, and nor is the practice simply another form of propaganda.¹⁶ Whilst cultural diplomacy is now considered to be both conceptually and practically a subset of public diplomacy,¹⁷ which can be defined as a government's communication with

12 Kevin V. Mulcahy, 'Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Introduction', *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1999), pp. 3–6.

13 Cultural diplomacy can also advance the interests of other countries. India's heavy focus on providing scholarships to students from neighbouring countries to study in India serves to advance India's interests and those of its neighbours.

14 New Zealand's recent cultural diplomacy has also incorporated the naming of a street in New Delhi after the great New Zealand explorer, Sir Edmund Hillary, who, with Tenzing Norgay, was the first to climb Mt Everest, in 1953. Fifty years later, Sir Edmund, a former New Zealand High Commissioner to India, was in New Delhi to open the street on which the New Zealand High Commission is located, 'Sir Edmund Hillary Marg'. An adjoining street was named Tenzing Norgay Marg.

15 For instance, reaching India's sizeable diaspora has long been a focus of the work of the cultural centres operated by India's cultural agency, the India Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR).

16 See also Simon Mark, 'A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy', Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2009); and Simon Mark, 'A Comparative Study of the Cultural diplomacy of Canada, India and New Zealand' (PhD thesis, University of Auckland, 2008).

17 The inclusion of cultural diplomacy within public diplomacy's remit represents a recent sea change in the way cultural diplomacy is regarded and practised. The new emphasis by governments on communicating with foreign audiences such as members of the public and the media recognizes that the attitude of these audiences plays a determining role in governments' ability to pursue their foreign policy objectives.

foreign audiences in order to positively influence them,¹⁸ some elements of public diplomacy such as reactive media briefings sit outside cultural diplomacy's rubric. Similarly, while there is a strong connection between international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy, the two are different. Not all international cultural relations involve a government, nor do they contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy. Those international cultural relations that do involve government need not necessarily contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy.¹⁹ Finally, despite Higham's characterization of cultural diplomacy as 'self-interested national-propaganda',²⁰ it is wrong simply to suggest that cultural diplomacy is merely a type of propaganda. Melissen's distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy uses a continuum ranging from 'crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects' to 'two-way public diplomacy for the "long haul" based on dialogue with foreign audiences',²¹ and this continuum can equally apply to cultural diplomacy. Melissen thinks propaganda involves the 'rather primitive business of peddling one's own views and narrowing other people's minds',²² whereas modern public diplomacy is two-way, involving engagement, dialogue and mutuality, and it recognizes that there are domestic audiences which a foreign service can communicate with in order to 'get through to foreign audiences'.²³ Cultural diplomacy – the deployment of aspects of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy – may sometimes involve the peddling of the state's own views, but it seldom seeks to narrow other people's minds,²⁴ and even if it did seek to achieve such an outcome, culture has an inherent honesty to it that could well thwart such efforts.

18 See Robin Higham, 'The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada', in Jean-Paul Baillargeon (ed.), *The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization* (Ontario: Grubstreet Editions, 2001), pp. 134–42; Edmund Marsden, interview by the author, Delhi, 2003; Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002); United States Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, *Cultural Diplomacy. The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy. Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2005); and Cynthia P. Schneider, 'Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works', in Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 147–68.

19 See Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* for a well-written treatise on the distinction between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations.

20 Higham, 'The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada', p. 138.

21 Jan Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', in Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p. 8.

22 Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', p. 8.

23 Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', p. 9.

24 The cultural diplomacy of the Indian state of Gujarat following the communal carnage in the state in 2002 indicates that the narrowing of other people's minds which propaganda seeks to achieve can take the form of glossing over the 'truth', making a much maligned (and to some a racist and violent state) seem appealing or normal through the attraction of culture.

The cultural diplomacy of Canada and Quebec

Cultural sovereignty

The cultural diplomacy of both the federation of Canada and Quebec has played a role in efforts to protect their respective cultural sovereignty. Federal cultural diplomacy, undertaken jointly by its foreign ministry and by the Department of Canadian Heritage, has taken place within a national cultural policy framework that simultaneously aims to ensure that Canadians have had access to the best cultural performances and products from other countries whilst establishing and protecting Canada's cultural sovereignty. Canadian governments – and Canadians themselves – place great importance on the role that culture plays in Canada's national identity, and this was reflected in the decision in 1995 to make the projection of Canadian values and culture the 'third pillar' of Canadian foreign policy. The promotion abroad of Canadian culture within the context of the third pillar was to be undertaken for three reasons.²⁵ First, Canadian culture should be promoted abroad because it made money and created jobs. Second, Canada should promote its culture abroad because doing so supports the capacity of Canadian artists and cultural industries to survive against foreign competition.²⁶ Third, Canada must promote its culture abroad because:

in the medium- and long-term, a country that does not project a clearly defined image of what it is and what it represents, is doomed to anonymity on the international scene. Only Canadian culture can express the uniqueness of our country, which is bilingual, multicultural, and deeply influenced by its Aboriginal roots, the North, the oceans, and its own vastness.²⁷

The influence of the Canadian historian and philosopher John Ralston Saul is evident in this support for the notion that Canada should counter international anonymity. Saul's report to a joint parliamentary committee that examined Canadian foreign policy in 1994 (out of which came the decision to make the promotion abroad of Canadian culture and values the third pillar of Canada's foreign policy), declared that national images play an important role in international relations because a state's influence in the world community is affected by its image. International presence depends on image projection, and the absence of such a presence not only means 'disappearing from the planet', or simply a lost cultural and financial opportunity, but also is a major problem for foreign policy.²⁸ Because Canada's profile abroad is, for the most part, its culture, its image, it is crucial to

25 The promotion abroad of Canada's values, which the 1995 review identified as 'respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment', was seen as key to the achievement of prosperity within Canada and to the protection of global security.

26 Foreign Affairs Canada, 'Canada in the World', *Foreign Policy Review*, 1995, available at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.

27 Foreign Affairs Canada, 'Canada in the World'.

28 John R. Saul, 'Culture and Foreign Policy', in *Canada's Foreign Policy: Position Papers, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Canadian Communication Group Publishing, 1994), p. 85.

support national cultural capacity and to promote culture abroad.²⁹ As the Canadian federal Minister of Canadian Heritage noted in 2005:

Without uniquely Canadian voices, we would be a country of disconnected fragments. We could not share with each other, and the world, *our* stories, *our* viewpoints and *our* experiences. These voices – of our artists, songwriters, authors, and performers – tell us about who we are; about where we have come from; about what matters to us. They tell us that we are not a pale imitation of anyone else.³⁰

The reference to a ‘pale imitation of anyone else’ alludes to the impact on Canada’s sense of cultural identity brought about by the cultural domination of the United States. That domination is due to proximity, a shared language, the United States’ position as the largest producer of cultural goods and services in the world, the passion of Canadian consumers for foreign cultural goods, and the openness of Canada to those goods,³¹ and the constraints faced by the small size of the domestic market for Canada’s cultural producers. In response to this domination, successive federal governments have undertaken a range of initiatives aimed at promoting a Canadian identity, a sense of pride in Canada, and at ensuring continued access by Canadians to Canadian cultural products. These initiatives have included cultural diplomacy aimed at providing support for international cultural tours, Canadian Studies abroad, and the international activities of Canada’s cultural industries. Federal Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), has provided financial support to professional artists and cultural organizations to showcase their work abroad in order to promote Canada’s interests abroad,³² particularly in countries relevant to Canada’s current foreign trade policy. It also has links to a network of cultural attachés which DFAIT employs in Canadian diplomatic missions.³³ About 70 per cent of the funding allocated to cultural diplomacy focuses on the G8 countries in recognition of their strategic importance to Canadian foreign policy. In addition, about 15 per cent of total grants contributes to activities in other priority countries: China, India, Brazil and Mexico. The federal

29 Potter notes that despite cuts to the federal budget over the period 1995–8, the foreign affairs ministry nevertheless managed to refurbish Canada House in London, and the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris, and protect its cultural grants programme. Evan Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy,’ Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 81 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2002), p. 8.

30 Liza Frulla, ‘How Culture Defines Who We Are’, Speech, Toronto, Ontario, 9 May 2005, available at: www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/discours-speeches/2005/frulla/2005-05-09_e.cfm.

31 Government of Canada: Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, ‘New Strategies for Culture and Trade’, in *Canadian Culture in a Global World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 1999).

32 Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ‘Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural Industries Program’, October 2002, available at: www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/department/auditreports/evaluation/evalACA02-en.pdf.

33 In the 2004–5 financial year, CAN\$1.8 million was provided to 30 Canadian missions abroad. Grants totalling CAN\$4.7 million were awarded to cultural groups and individuals

government's Canadian Studies Program seeks to advance Canadian foreign policy by building a network of well-informed foreign professionals and leaders with a sustained interest in Canada.

DFAIT's cultural diplomacy is complemented by the cultural diplomacy of the Department of Canadian Heritage, which incorporates marketing cultural industries internationally (and support for their development domestically), operating, in association with DFAIT, an International Francophonie secretariat, managing Canada's international cultural diversity agenda (including the new international instrument on cultural diversity), and responsibility for Canada's involvement in international expositions such as that held at Aichi in Japan in 2005.

Quebec's efforts to protect its cultural sovereignty have included cultural diplomacy associated with the preservation internationally of the French language and support for artists, arts companies and cultural industries in Quebec and abroad. This has been undertaken not simply to achieve economic, political and domestic objectives,³⁴ but to support Quebec's continuing cultural distinctiveness, in part in order to assert and protect Quebec's place and within an Anglo federation.

Quebec's cultural diplomacy has been one component of an extensive international engagement by the province. Since 1985, Quebec has operated its own 'para-diplomatic service', complete with its 'own minister, a corps of officials specializing in international affairs, and a network of foreign representatives'.³⁵ By the year 2000, the province had become the world's foremost proponent of sub-national government activity. In 1996, Quebec spent more, and had a larger international staff than all 50 of the states of the United States combined.³⁶ It had more offices abroad (nearly 30 in 18 countries in

working in film, dance, music, theatre, the visual arts and literature, to enable them to tour internationally, and to help bring foreign buyers to arts festivals in Canada. This sum excluded funds for a four-year promotion in France, called Canada-France 2004-2008. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 'Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural Industries Program'.

- 34 One objective of Quebec's cultural diplomacy has been the desire of the province to show itself to the world, not just to seek recognition for its distinctiveness, but to *celebrate* that distinctiveness abroad, and to take pride in the recognition by others of its achievements. This was particularly true in, and immediately following, the Quiet Revolution. It has also aimed to shape an accurate perception of Quebec internationally, stimulate interest internationally in Quebec, and raise the province's profile abroad.
- 35 The number of locations had varied over the 1990s due to budget constraints. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Canadian representatives created a Quebec agency in London so that they could be heard directly. In the period from World War II to the 1960s, the only Quebec presence abroad was a tourist and commercial office, opened in New York in 1941. Quebec established its own international relations department in 1967. Louis Balthazar, 'Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities', in Brian Hocking (ed.), *Foreign Relations and Federal States* (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), p. 141.
- 36 Fry, quoted in Louis Belanger, 'The Domestic Politics of Quebec's Quest for External Distinctiveness', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, No. 2 (2002), p. 197.

2006), more staff devoted to international activities, and more money appropriated to international pursuits – CAN\$100 million in 2004 – than the nine other Canadian provinces combined.³⁷

The foundations of Quebec's quest for international recognition were laid during the period of the Quiet Revolution, the fundamental transformation of Quebec society in the 1960s which modernized and secularized Quebec society, brought greater political and economic power to the French-speaking majority, and sought to raise Quebec's status within the Canadian confederation.³⁸ Quebec changed, in a very short space of time, from a 'state-less', insular, conservative, Catholic polity to a modern, open, secular and outward-looking state.³⁹ The Revolution had a strong nationalistic and international dimension. Its nationalistic tone was encapsulated in a 1965 speech by the Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, to the members of the Montréal consular corps, in which he declared that while Quebec was not 'sovereign in all domains' because of its membership of a federation:

... from a political point of view, it constitutes a state. It possesses all the characteristics of a state: territory, population, autonomous government. Beyond this, it is the political expression of a people distinguished, in a number of ways, from the English-language communities inhabiting North America.

Quebec, in Gérin-Lajoie's words, was 'the political instrument of a cultural group, distinct and unique in all of North America'.⁴⁰ Within such a framework, a 'cultural universe' with its axis in Europe, it was natural that Quebec would seek to develop its international relations, and that the focus of these relations would be cultural. There was also a strong desire amongst French Canadians to 'open windows' and establish rapport with other peoples,⁴¹ a marked determination to assert what Quebec believed was its right to engage with other countries under the Canadian constitution, and a sense of

37 The general delegation, the most substantive Quebec diplomatic office, provided services in all sectors under the constitutional jurisdiction of Canadian provinces, exclusive or shared, particularly the economy, education, culture and immigration, as well as public affairs. By 2005, general delegations were located in Brussels, London, Mexico City, New York City, Paris and Tokyo.

38 Earl H. Fry, 'Quebec's Relations with the United States', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, No. 2 (2002), p. 326.

39 Belanger, 'The Domestic Politics of Quebec's Quest for External Distinctiveness', p. 198. In Ryan's view, the Quiet Revolution was 'the Age of Enlightenment in Quebec ... a great opening out upon the rest of the world'. Claude Ryan, 'The Origins of Quebec's Cultural Diplomacy', in Andrew Fenton Cooper (ed.), *Canadian Culture: International Dimensions* (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1985), p. 61.

40 Paul Gérin-Lajoie, in Government of Quebec, 'Quebec's Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues', March 2001, available at: www.saic.gouv.qc.ca/publications/Positions/Part2/PaulGuerinLajoie1965_en.pdf.

41 D. Pacom, 'Being French in North America: Quebec Culture and Globalization', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2001), pp.441–2; Balthazar, 'Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities', p. 144.

displacement within an Anglo federation which coincided with the coming to power in Quebec of a new generation of leaders with considerable experience on the international scene.

The primary activities associated with the presentation of Quebec's cultural distinctiveness abroad have been the province's support for the French language, and its concomitant relationship with France. Quebec's most noticeable distinction has always been its use of French, and the province's relationship with France has been at the heart of its international engagement.⁴² Quebec's place as the only French-speaking polity on the American continent has always been acknowledged by France, and by La Francophonie, the community of French-speaking political entities, which has been created and nurtured by France.⁴³ In 2005, Quebec's Foreign Minister noted that France was 'at the top of the list' of Quebec's relationships in Europe. 'It is no secret that it holds a special place in our international relations, both bilaterally and multilaterally.'⁴⁴ Quebec's international policy framework, released in May 2006, a 'comprehensive international vision' which aimed to strengthen Quebec's international influence, declared that the vulnerability of the French language would remain a 'major driver of the government's international initiatives'.⁴⁵ Quebec has supported the worldwide promotion and recognition of the French language, primarily through La Francophonie. But La Francophonie has provided more to Quebec than simply a method of supporting French internationally. It has been a source of support for Quebec's aspirations to be recognized as a distinct culture, with a unique position on the American continent. The organization has provided the province with a tool that helps it achieve its wish to be treated internationally as an equal amongst sovereign nation-states, and has provided a precedent for the sort of role Quebec wishes to undertake internationally, one free from Ottawa's constraints and interference. Belanger argues that Quebec's involvement in La Francophonie, and the its precursor bodies, has been the 'the preferred battleground for the Quebec-Canada conflict over Quebec's international personality'.⁴⁶

42 The first major international agreements were signed in 1965 with the French government in the fields of education and culture. Ryan notes that in the 1960s, a French office was set up in Quebec with direct links to the Élysée Palace. He notes too that Quebec found a willing friend in France, at a serendipitous time in France's history. In the mid-1960s, France was also looking outwards, to countries of the former French empire, which might provide a renewed *raison d'être* for French global aspirations. Ryan, 'The Origins of Quebec's Cultural Diplomacy', p. 63.

43 Government of Quebec, *Quebec's International Policy, Working in Concert* (Quebec: Ministère des Relations Internationales, 2006), Chapter 6.

44 Government of Quebec, *Quebec's Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues*, available at: www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/Politique_en.pdf.

45 Government of Quebec, *Quebec's International Policy, Working in Concert*.

46 Belanger, 'The Domestic Politics of Quebec's Quest for External Distinctiveness'. Quebec's decision, in 1968, to accept an invitation to attend the Francophone education ministers' conference in Gabon resulted in the federal government expelling Gabon's ambassador. The education minister's meeting, whilst not within a formal Francophonie entity, was attended by ministers of Francophone countries.

National image and branding

Both Federal Canada and Quebec have sought to present their respective international profiles and up-to-date images abroad. The cultural diplomacy of federal Canada has focused on Canada's modern economy and its multiculturalism. It has sought to update its image from a country of forests and lakes to a multicultural, modern, creative, innovative and technologically advanced country. The presentation of this new image has not been linked particularly to a national brand, something which has remained absent from the federal Canadian political landscape in part due to problems associated with the activity abroad of a number of Canadian provinces. Federal Canada's involvement in the 2005 international exposition (usually known as an Expo) in Aichi provides insight into the type of image the federal government wishes to present abroad. Under the theme *Wisdom of Diversity*, Canada sought to present an image of the federation that was 'more than just a panorama of natural landscapes, places and people'. The image to be presented through the cultural programme was concerned with presenting a diverse Canada.⁴⁷ For the Minister for Canadian Heritage, Canada's presence enabled it to highlight all of Canada's diversity, 'whether in cultural, environmental, economic, or innovative technological terms' (as well as promote Canadian interests and allow Canadians to be recognized for their tradition of excellence).⁴⁸ The programme of visual, literary and performing arts sought to highlight Canada's diversity and creativity. Performers included the international star Alanis Morissette, who sang in English; a Rwandan-born Canadian singer in French; a native dance troupe; an Acadian fiddler; Senegalese-Canadian brother musicians; a break-dance and hip-hop contemporary dance company; a Canadian version of Bob Dylan; a First Nation hip-hop trio; a Japanese-Canadian classical pianist, and so on. The stories of six storytellers aimed further to emphasize the strength of Canadian diversity. A young French-speaking dancer's Canada 'within her' reflected her 'homeland's sense of international fairness and cooperation and its acceptance of internal diversity'. A successful Chinese-born landscape architect had tolerance come to her 'by osmosis' in Canada, from having lived side by side with so many people from all over the world, thereby recognizing the 'strengths that bind us'. The other Canadians were a white English-speaking Midwestern male with a PhD; a young male Inuit filmmaker; a young female Somali-Canadian media star; and a middle-aged French speaking male scientific researcher.⁴⁹

47 The emphasis on Canada's diversity was also a feature of 'Think Canada' in Japan in 2001, an initiative managed by DFAIT. A report on the initiative noted that it had 'deepened understanding of the real Canada; the one that is alive with the benefits that come from a multicultural society'. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada-Japan Cultural Relations*, 27 July 2006, available at: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/asia/main/japan/canchinculture-en.asp>.

48 Department of Canadian Heritage, 'Minister Frulla Announces Canada's Cultural Programming at Expo 2005', 4 February 2005, available at: www.pch.gc.ca/newsroom/index_e.cfm?fuseaction=displayDocument&DocIDc=4N0269.

49 Department of Canadian Heritage. 'Six Storytellers', at: www.expo2005canada.gc.ca/en/canada_pavilion/six_storytellers.html (no longer available).

The new emphasis on image in Canada's cultural diplomacy has not been linked to a national brand because of the absence of an umbrella brand for Canada. Canadian diplomat Daryl Copeland noted in 2003 that Canada's international reputation was out of date, failing to accurately reflect Canada's true capabilities on the world stage, because of its failure to purposefully brand itself abroad. In his view, foreigners' perceptions of Canada were dominated by 'Mounties, open space, and clean air', rather than a high-tech, knowledge-driven, sophisticated and cosmopolitan economy.⁵⁰ Writing on Canadian public diplomacy, Potter has blamed Canada's image problem partly on the domestic focus of the foreign ministry's website, partly on the anonymity of Canadian television programming shown abroad (much of which lacked a specific Canadian brand), and partly on the activism of actors other than the foreign ministry, in particular the federal tourism marketing entity and those provinces such as Quebec that were active internationally. Potter argues that the Canadian Tourism Commission promotes Canada as a pristine and clean vacation destination and that this is at odds with the federal trade commissioners' desire to project an image of Canada as a sophisticated, high-technology country.⁵¹ Potter also noted that several provinces, most notably Quebec, undertook international promotional activity, something with which Batora agrees:⁵² for example, Quebec undertakes extensive international promotional activity, Alberta spent CAN\$3.8 million on an 'Alberta Week in Washington', which the provincial government said aimed to 'highlight and strengthen Alberta's more than CAN\$60 billion a year export relationship with the United States',⁵³ and the province of Manitoba seeks to enhance its image internationally to advance its economic interests and to demonstrate the province's 'attractiveness as a destination for international tourists, immigrants, and students'.⁵⁴

In the case of Quebec, the image presented abroad through its active cultural diplomacy programme has been that of a vibrant, creative and distinctive French-speaking polity. Quebec's image abroad, presented through its cultural diplomacy, has not simply been concerned with showing the province's cultural and political distinctiveness, but has also had a strong economic dimension to it. As with the federation of Canada, Quebec's cultural sector has become a major component of the province's economy, an economy which, since the 1960s, had grown to become the world's 28th largest,⁵⁵ slightly smaller than that of Norway. In order to ensure that this increasingly important sector of the Quebec economy continued to grow, over the years Quebec has provided

50 Daryl Copeland, 'Canada Now: Fading Power or Future Power?', *Proceedings of the National Foreign Policy Conference*, Toronto, 28–30 March 2003 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2003).

51 Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p. 16.

52 Foreign Affairs Canada, 'Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World', in *Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005).

53 Government of Alberta, 'Alberta at the Smithsonian', news release, 22 June 2006, available at: www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200606/20141FD4B2BF8-EC20-675A-DEAC54287840C9EE.html.

54 Government of Manitoba, 'Reaching Beyond our Borders. The Framework for Manitoba's International Activities', available at: www.gov.mb.ca/international/pdfs/rbob.pdf.

55 Fry, 'Quebec's Relations with the United States'.

substantial support for artists, arts companies and cultural industries, both in Quebec and for their work abroad. CAN\$400 million was provided to support the creation of artistic works in 2006.⁵⁶ Quebec also provided substantial support for major international events, such as conventions, conferences and festivals, in order to enhance its international reputation, support tourism and 'offer a worldwide window on the enterprising spirit of Quebecers'.⁵⁷ The government noted that it invested over CAN\$20 million in support of Quebec artists abroad, which, it said, enabled 'two hundred cultural organizations, aided by advisers and cultural attachés at Quebec delegations abroad, to put on tours, prepare co-productions or explore new markets'.⁵⁸ Quebec's 2006 international policy noted that 'a substantial part of what is written about Quebec in the foreign press concerns its artists and creators', who directly shaped Quebec's image and reputation abroad, and were among the major expressions of its identity.⁵⁹ International activity provided them with 'stimulation and inspiration'. It allowed for international collaboration, which helped spread risk. It helped them stay economically viable by developing their money-making capacity by expanding their markets.

Domestic objectives

The cultural diplomacy of both the federal government and Quebec has had clear domestic objectives. Federal cultural diplomacy has sought to reinforce Ottawa's right to speak on behalf of Canada abroad. It has done this by emphasizing the multicultural nature of the Canadian federation, a federation in which Quebec is one of ten provinces and French-ness simply another form of ethnicity.

By contrast, Quebec's cultural diplomacy, as an element of its foreign policy activity and international activism, has been concerned with asserting the province's rights within the federation. Quebec has not accepted that the federal government has the sole power to devise and implement foreign policy, and to speak abroad for Canada. Rather, Quebec defines the federation, in concept and in practice, as one which is bicultural, rather than multicultural in nature, which incorporates a unique polity – a French-speaking nation on the American continent. Its cultural diplomacy was also associated, at one time, with supporting the secessionist movement.

In 2005, Quebec sought to negotiate a formal mechanism with the federal government that would provide Quebec with a 'more coherent and predictable framework' for the

56 The Quebec Arts Council provided grants to artists and troupes, and the Société de Développement des Entreprises Culturelles was created especially to develop the commercial side of culture. For Charest, this two-pronged involvement, which included wide-ranging support for professional training and cultural exports, was a key element to the remarkably dynamic development of Quebec culture, which he notes has resulted in an artist from Quebec performing every second day, somewhere in Britain, Wales, Scotland or Ireland. Remy Charest, 'Quebec: Growing into the World', *Arts From Canada*, July 2000, available at: www.visitingarts.org.uk/features/v43qg.html.

57 Government of Quebec, *Culture Quebec. A Culture That Travels the World* (Quebec: Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec, 2001), p. 11.

58 Government of Quebec, *Culture Quebec. A Culture That Travels the World*.

59 Government of Quebec, *Quebec's International Policy*, p. 86.

exercise of its international responsibilities. Quebec argued that there was a precedent for a formal mechanism. Quebec's participation in La Francophonie was not subject to the 'vagaries of the moment', and since 1975 the 'means and mechanisms' existed to enable the province to participate in the drafting of agreements concerning human rights.⁶⁰ Quebec asked that Canada's federal diplomacy be undertaken in a federal manner, which it said would make Canada's international actions much more effective, 'strengthen Canada's image abroad', and hence 'put a stop to the weakening of Canada's image and influence in the world'.⁶¹

Quebec's efforts to secure what it regarded as its constitutional rights need to be situated within the broad context of the relationship between Quebec and the federal government over the nature of the Canadian federation. Was the federation to comprise English and French speakers, and a unique province called Quebec, or was it to be a federation based on multiculturalism, in which the Francophones formed just another ethnic group, and Quebec just one of many provinces? Quebec's quest for recognition of its cultural distinctiveness was shaped fundamentally by the actions of the Canadian Prime Minister, the late Pierre Trudeau. During the 1960s, Trudeau sought to negate Quebec's claims to distinctiveness by subsuming it within a national identity based on coast-to-coast bilingualism and multiculturalism. His view was that Quebec could – and should – be fully integrated with Canada as a whole, rather than sitting apart from it as a distinct polity. As McRoberts notes, Trudeau proceeded from the assumption that 'Quebec nationalism, like any other nationalism, cannot and should not be accommodated within political institutions: the only result would be to legitimize demands for the creation of an independent Quebec state'.⁶²

The heart of Trudeau's strategy was official bilingualism. If all of Canada was bilingual, then Quebec's claim to distinctiveness would be weakened. The bilingual core of the Trudeau strategy was accompanied by three additional prongs – provincial equality, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and multiculturalism, which were clearly aimed at Quebec. By recognizing a multitude of cultures, 'multiculturalism could rein in the notion of duality and nullify Quebec's claims to distinctiveness on the basis of culture'.⁶³ Trudeau's view was that 'the term biculturalism does not accurately depict' Canada's society; 'the word multiculturalism is more precise in this respect'.⁶⁴ The patriation of the Canadian constitution without Quebec's assent, in 1982, and subsequent constitutional battles, further exacerbated Quebec's sense of isolation from the federation.

One additional domestic objective of Quebec's cultural diplomacy should be noted. Quebec's cultural diplomacy was at times driven by a desire to gather international

60 Government of Quebec, 'Quebec in International Forums', *Quebec's International Initiatives*, No. 1, October 2005, available at: www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/action_internationale1.pdf.

61 Government of Quebec, 'Quebec in International Forums'.

62 Kenneth McRoberts, 'English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue', lecture, 5 March 1991, available at: www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/lectures/pdf/r1_mcroberts.pdf.

63 McRoberts, 'English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue'.

64 McRoberts, 'English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue'.

support for and recognition of its right to secede from the Canadian federation. Balthazar is of the view that the government of Quebec was involved in promoting abroad sovereignty for Quebec in the brief pre-referendum period of 1994–5, under the leadership of premier Jacques Parizeau.⁶⁵ It would, however, be incorrect to suggest that secessionist goals have always been an element of Quebec's cultural diplomacy. The international activism of Jean Charest's Liberal government since 2003 has, as expected, been that of a federalist, not a secessionist, government. However, even during the Parti Québécois government of 1976–85, the range and intensity of Quebec's international relations were not significantly extended, except at the economic level, and Quebec's missions abroad were not used to 'promote the ideal of sovereignty'.⁶⁶

New Zealand's cultural diplomacy

New Zealand's cultural diplomacy provides an interesting example of the role that cultural diplomacy plays in the presentation abroad of a national image, and the extent to which such an image is tied to a national brand. It also illustrates cultural diplomacy's role in the pursuit of domestic objectives. However, unlike the Canadian case, the New Zealand experience has not been closely tied to the protection of cultural sovereignty. New Zealand has remained relatively unconcerned about the impact that foreign cultures may have had on its national identity. Certainly there have been times when politicians and the public alike have shown concern about the relative lack of New Zealand-made cultural products (such as television programmes and music), but these concerns have never reached the same level as those in Canada.

National image and branding

Until recently there was little systematic effort by New Zealand officials to use cultural diplomacy to present a particular image of New Zealand abroad. The Cultural Exchange Programme of the 1970s did attempt to project abroad what it called 'the New Zealand personality',⁶⁷ but this was to be through a broad programme of cultural exchanges. The triumphant tour of the United States of 'Te Maori', an exhibition of Maori artefacts drawn from museum collections throughout New Zealand (discussed in greater detail below) did not focus on presenting a particular national image of New Zealand. Nor did the cultural diplomacy undertaken in the UK at the time of New Zealand's sesquicentenary in 1990. No consideration was given to whether the programme showed New Zealand as a country that was of one sort (i.e. clean and green) or another (i.e. innovative

65 Balthazar, 'Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities', p. 143.

66 Balthazar, 'Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities'. It can be assumed that the continued negative reaction by the United States to the idea of Quebec sovereignty had an influence on the manner in which the secessionist issue was managed in that country.

67 Frank Corner to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 November 1973 (ABHS 950 W4627. Box 1832. 66/1/1a. Part 1. New Zealand Affairs: Educational and Cultural Relations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

and technologically savvy). The primary unstated objective of the commemoration in the UK was to ensure those in the UK able to do so would work on New Zealand's behalf to uphold New Zealand's interests in Britain, in particular its considerable economic and defence interests. The issue for New Zealand in 1987 and 1988 in relation to its relationship with the UK was how to maximize support for New Zealand interests when the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was opposed to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, the UK Minister of Agriculture was 'under fire from his farmers about New Zealand butter',⁶⁸ and New Zealand seemed to be becoming more remote to Britain.

By contrast, the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme (CDIP), launched on 5 July 2004 by Prime Minister Helen Clark,⁶⁹ was very much concerned with image and with linking this to a New Zealand brand. The objectives of the CDIP were, first, to project, in targeted settings, a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage; and, second, to position New Zealand among targeted overseas audiences as a country they could understand and want to engage with. In addition, one of the seven principles underpinning the operation of the programme was that its messages would 'not be inconsistent' with the national brand position of clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced.

The presentation of a contemporary image of New Zealand was of considerable importance to the programme, and to its most powerful supporter, Prime Minister Clark. The CDIP was to present abroad an up-to-date image of New Zealand, and it was to do this within an up-to-date brand for New Zealand. The initial focus on presenting a 'distinctive profile' of New Zealand – a 'creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage' – was changed in its practice by Clark to one of projecting New Zealand as 'unique, creative, innovative and moving ahead'. This sent a clear message to officials about the kind of activities that should be funded under the cultural diplomacy programme, and the nature of the overall image of New Zealand to be portrayed.

The view that a new image was crucial to advancing New Zealand interests was based upon a number of assumptions. First, it was assumed that the image of New Zealand held by people abroad was outdated and inaccurate. Second, it was assumed that culture was an effective tool with which to update New Zealand's image as a country that was creative, technologically advanced and moving ahead. Third, it was assumed that the new image of New Zealand had a favourable impact on the behaviour of people who were the targets of the presentation of that image. If New Zealand was seen as innovative, for example, it was assumed that those wishing to buy innovative goods would think about buying New Zealand products, or might actually buy them. In the same vein, students looking to be educated abroad would be attracted to New Zealand not only

68 Bryce Harland, 'The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy', in Geraldine McDonald and Richard Benton (eds), *The Beeby Fascicles*, Fascicle 3 (Wellington: Te Aro, 1992), p. 47.

69 Helen Clark, 'Govt [*sic*] Launches New Cultural Diplomacy Programme', news release, 5 July 2004, available at: www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=20235.

because it offered first-world, high-ranking universities, but because New Zealand was ‘sophisticated, upmarket, first world, truly 21st century’.⁷⁰ This assumption, that image would affect behaviour, was well expressed in the comment of a New Zealand diplomat:

The promotion of the film [Whale Rider] in a country like South Africa would enhance all aspects of our relationship with South Africa, from trade and tourism to international co-operation where it would be to our advantage to counter the general perception (amongst much of the new ANC leadership) that we are quasi Brits.⁷¹

Despite the difficulty in ensuring that the CDIP’s cultural diplomacy activities showed New Zealand as ‘unique, creative, innovative and moving ahead’ (and it is difficult for a single event to show New Zealand as ‘unique, creative, innovative and moving ahead’ all at the same time), there has nevertheless been an effort to support activities within the CDIP which adhere to this image and to eschew those which do not. Efforts to adhere to this image have focused not simply on individual events, which emphasize modernity or innovation, for instance, but on clusters of events in which a traditional cultural manifestation such as *kapa haka* would be counterbalanced with more modern cultural manifestations such as contemporary music.

The attempt to link the CDIP’s activities to a national brand has, however, been less successful. The requirement by government that the CDIP’s activities present a contemporary image of New Zealand in a manner that was ‘not inconsistent’ with a modern articulation of Brand New Zealand, described as ‘clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced’ reflected the advice the government received from officials about a supposed modern articulation of Brand New Zealand. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage officials who had drafted this articulation arrived at it by simply merging two contradictory strands in the official presentation abroad of an image of New Zealand.

One strand – that promoted by the national tourism promotion entity, Tourism New Zealand – marketed New Zealand abroad as a tourist destination of considerable natural beauty, and can best be seen as a promotional approach rather than a brand. The other, the branding activity of the national trade promotion entity, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, sought to brand New Zealand abroad as modern, innovative, technologically advanced, and hence worth investing in, moving to, or being educated in. The contradiction was evident in 2002 in the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF), the government’s overarching economic strategy under which the CDIP was funded:

Offshore perceptions of New Zealand are outdated. While there is some awareness internationally of our ‘clean green image’ from a tourism point of view there is too little awareness of New Zealand as an innovative country at the leading edge of knowledge. [New Zealand

70 Helen Clark, ‘Opening Address to the New Zealand Tourism Industry Association Conference’, speech, 10 August 2000, available at: www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=8138.

71 Warren Searell email to Ian Kennedy, Information and Public Affairs Division, 28 May 2003, File 2/1/3, Vol. 18 (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Files).

needs] to develop and promote a contemporary and future-focused Brand NZ, which projects New Zealand as a great place to invest in, live in, and visit . . . Government has committed a significant level of resources in conjunction with events such as the America's Cup and The Lord of the Rings to help promote an image of New Zealand as technologically advanced, creative and successful.⁷²

The GIF stipulated that initiatives funded under the framework would adhere to a consistent brand, a brand that presented abroad an image of a modern New Zealand with an advanced economy.⁷³ The framework's objective, to return New Zealand's per capita income to the top half of the OECD rankings, was to be achieved by focusing on nurturing and supporting innovation in New Zealand, and presented New Zealand's innovation abroad using the 'future-focused Brand New Zealand' and major events such as the America's Cup and *The Lord of the Rings*. A new image for New Zealand, it asserted, would attract 'overseas talent', foreign direct investment, students and tourists. Overseas talent would be attracted to the already established image of New Zealand as a beautiful and clean environment, and a safe and secure lifestyle, but would also respond to the added appeal of a New Zealand that was technologically advanced, innovative, creative and successful.⁷⁴

The articulation of a New Zealand brand in the establishment document of the CDIP was well intentioned but misconceived. This made it very difficult to link the programme's activities to a New Zealand brand. Simon Anholt argues that a national brand is comprised not of one single, all-encompassing brand aimed at and suitable for all audiences, but rather a set of strands aimed at differing audiences (such as tourists, would-be investors, audiences for the public diplomacy of a foreign ministry, and audiences for cultural diplomacy). Different audiences require different messages and different brands. The way to connect these distinct strands is not to ask one strand to be all things to all audiences but to be part of a national strategy, a 'good, clear, believable and positive idea of what [a] country really is, what it stands for and where it is going',⁷⁵ and to coordinate the actions, investments, policies and communications of all these various components so that they prove and reinforce this idea. In the New Zealand case, this has yet to be achieved, and efforts to implement a coherent national brand will continue to flounder so long as the concept and practice of a national brand is poorly understood.

Domestic objectives

One example of New Zealand's cultural diplomacy provides an illuminating example of the way that cultural diplomacy can be mobilized for domestic goals. 'Te Maori' opened its international tour at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, on 10 September

72 Government of New Zealand, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand* (Wellington: Office of the Prime Minister, 2002).

73 New Zealand Cabinet Minute. 'GIF Budget Allocation: Cultural Diplomacy International Programme: Policy and NZSO Funding Support', 25 May 2004, p. 3.

74 Government of New Zealand, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*.

75 Simon Anholt, *Competitive Identity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 26–7.

1984. The exhibition ‘showcased traditional Maori material culture’.⁷⁶ At each venue, the exhibition was opened with a dawn ceremony, and included traditional cultural performances. The New Zealand government’s objectives for the exhibition’s international tour were set out in the speech by the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, at the official opening in New York. Three themes were particularly evident. First, the exhibition sought to enhance Maori *mana*:

It is our hope that [Te Maori will] increase the *mana* of the Maori people . . . Te Maori shows that the Maori culture is a living one and that the Maori people are alive, vibrant and creative . . . The Maori are proud members of that country: proud of the contribution we make to the wealth of the country . . . proud of the history and culture that we give and participate in: proud of the contribution that we make to the shaping of a distinct New Zealand society and nation . . . the Maori people retain their separate identity, culture and language . . . All this is underpinned by a strong resurgence of and identification with Maori culture and history.⁷⁷

This aim, emphasized by Wetere, was noted in less emphatic terms by New Zealand’s foreign ministry early in the exhibition’s planning. The ministry anticipated that the exhibition would increase public consciousness of the value of the exhibition’s artefacts and lead to improved care of them in New Zealand.⁷⁸

Second, the exhibition provided a ‘soft-sell’ approach to add a further dimension to Americans’ awareness of New Zealand and more depth to their understanding of it.⁷⁹ This too was mentioned by Wetere:

America is not as well acquainted with New Zealand, and especially not with the Maori people. I hope that in the 18 months this exhibition tours through the US millions are educated and made aware of our country. New Zealand and the US have many common bonds and shared experiences. These bonds have been forged in war and peace, through trade, sport and tourism.⁸⁰

Third, the exhibition provided an opportunity to further wider interests. These included trade, investment and tourism:⁸¹ the exhibition would be ‘set alongside other efforts to

76 Bernie Kernot, ‘Te Maori Te Hokinga Mai: Some Reflections’, *AGMANZ Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1987), p. 4.

77 Koro Wetere, speech notes at the opening of ‘Te Maori’ at the Metropolitan Museum, 5 May 1984 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

78 As might be expected, given the ministry’s apolitical, public service role, this outcome did not seem to be particularly linked to enhancing Maori self-esteem.

79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, draft memorandum for Cabinet, 4 March 1981 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

80 Koro Wetere, speech notes at the opening of ‘Te Maori’.

81 M. Norrish to the Director-General of the New Zealand Forest Service, 19 December 1985 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1866. 71/4/4. Part 7. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

secure the attention of our American friends and commercial opportunities in that country'.⁸²

The extraordinary success of 'Te Maori' provided 'considerable scope' for extending its impact beyond the generation of goodwill at a time when New Zealand needed all the positive publicity it could garner.⁸³ New Zealand had a winner on its hands that could be used to counter the impact in the United States of the Lange government's ban on visits to New Zealand waters by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships. This was specifically set out by the foreign ministry in March 1985:

[T]he goodwill created by showing the exhibition in Chicago could be expected to advance New Zealand's broad political, economic and cultural interests in the United States. In particular it would be a useful counterbalance to adverse publicity generated by the ship visits issue.⁸⁴

Co-curator Sidney Moko Mead shared the government's view that the exhibition would enhance Maori *mana*: Mead saw the theme of 'Te Maori' as 'the return and rise of Maori *mana*'.⁸⁵ Maori art would be seen in a new light. Its customary placement in museums in New Zealand alongside 'stuffed animals, birds, insects and fishes' would no longer be acceptable once the same artefacts were shown as art objects on the very highest altar of institutional art, 'The Met'. Mead in fact preferred the title 'Mana Maori' for the exhibition, and was instrumental, with the director of the Auckland City Art Gallery, Rodney Wilson, in ensuring that the exhibition was shown not at the Auckland Museum but at the gallery.⁸⁶ Mead thought the exhibition was:

a good public relations exercise which might do us a lot of good at a time when we are calling for a greater measure of autonomy for the Maori in New Zealand and when we want our Treaty of Waitangi recognised internationally as the instrument which permits us to demand limited autonomy.⁸⁷

For Maori such as Kara Puketapu and Sidney Moko Mead, the exhibition provided an opportunity to use the power of international recognition for the benefit of Maori

82 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade draft memorandum for Cabinet, 4 March 1981.

83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade cable from New York Consul-General to Wellington, 2 July 1985 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1868. 71/4/4. Part 15. Te Maori).

84 M. Norrish to acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 March, 1985 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1868. 71/4/4. Part 16. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

85 Hirini Moko Mead, *Te Maori: Maori Art Form the New Zealand Collections* (Auckland: Heinemann, 1984), p. 32.

86 Hirini Moko Mead, *Magnificent Te Maori/Te Maori Whakahirahira: He Korero Whakanui I Te Maori* (Auckland: Heinemann, 1986), p. 97. The title was rejected as being too close to the Maori party Mana Motuhake. Instead 'Te Maori' was decided upon.

87 Hirini Moko Mead, Letter to Wilder Green, 23 February 1981 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

interests at home in the manner articulated by Tipene O'Regan: 'the surest way to raise Pakeha awareness of the value of anything . . . is for distinguished overseas institutions to pay laudatory attention to it'.⁸⁸

Conclusion

This article has explored the divergent use of cultural diplomacy in Canada, Quebec and New Zealand. A number of contrasts, differences and similarities can be discerned.

First, the cultural diplomacy of Canada and New Zealand has placed increased emphasis on presenting a modern image abroad, with both states wishing to move away from outdated images of themselves to an emphasis on their advanced economies, technological sophistication and cultural vitality. The cultural diplomacy of Canada and New Zealand supports the notion that countries now believe that their chances of competing successfully internationally are helped by showing a modern national image to those investing, or moving, or studying, or indeed taking in the tourist sites. The cultural diplomacy of Quebec in part dislodges this trend. It does so because its motivations differ from those of Canada and New Zealand. The cultural diplomacy of Quebec seeks not simply to show a modern state able to hold its own when seeking investment, tourists, students and immigrants – and there is a clear economic dimension to Quebec's cultural diplomacy – but a culturally distinctive state wishing to hold its own in a federation it sees as downplaying Quebec's status as a unique French-speaking nation. National image is not simply about advancing economic interests. In the case of Quebec, it is also about advancing political interests.

Second, the three case studies serve to indicate that the link between cultural diplomacy's presentation of a national image and a national brand remains weak, even in the most recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, a country which has most strongly sought to link a national image to a national brand. The weakness of this linkage is primarily because of a lack of understanding amongst policy-makers about the concept and practice of branding, and this is likely to remain the case until the concept of the brand that emerged in the private sector can be effectively transformed for use in the public sector.

Third, the cultural diplomacy of Canada and Quebec indicates that cultural diplomacy can play a role in efforts by some states to protect their cultural sovereignty. This is to be expected: national identity helps set states apart from one another, and cultural diplomacy can go to the very heart of a state's identity because culture – the 'cultural' part of cultural diplomacy – is a core element of national identity. Cultural diplomacy's role in the protection of cultural sovereignty is most strongly evident in the cultural diplomacy of Canada, which has supported that state's broad efforts to ensure it retains the capacity to generate its own cultural voices in the face of an overwhelming cultural behemoth across the border. The cultural diplomacy of Quebec, by contrast, has supported the

88 Conal McCarthy, 'From Curio to Taonga: A Genealogy of Display at New Zealand's National Museum, 1865–2001' (PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2004), Chapter 4.

state's efforts to protect its cultural distinctiveness in the face of what Quebec perceives to be a threat not from abroad, but from the very federation it is part of. New Zealand's cultural diplomacy has not been implicated in the protection of its cultural sovereignty. This idea – of a cultural sovereignty under threat and in need of protection – has never really established a strong foothold in the New Zealand political landscape. When contrasted to the experience of Canada, and indeed of Quebec, this is not surprising. Australia – New Zealand's very own version of Canada's United States – has not had a cultural impact on New Zealand that would serve to undermine New Zealand's capacity to generate its own cultural voices.

Finally, it is clear that the cultural diplomacy of Canada, Quebec and New Zealand has played a role in pursuing the domestic objectives of national and sub-national governments. For both Canada and Quebec, cultural diplomacy has included seeking to assert their respective status and rights in relation to one another. Quebec, as has been noted, has also used cultural diplomacy in the pursuit of its secessionist aspirations. The federal government has done the opposite. Former diplomat Robin Higham has called for a well-funded 'national project of cultural diplomacy' to achieve a wide range of domestic objectives. He argues such a project could help to build an improved sense of identity within Canada, thus contributing to its social cohesion, helping counterbalance the pressures of global homogenization and making Canada interesting to Canadians by 'discovering what makes Canada interesting to others'.⁸⁹ In New Zealand's case, domestic objectives have included making New Zealanders more 'Asia-literate' and developing and promoting national culture. But the best-known example of a cultural diplomacy event in New Zealand's recent history, 'Te Maori', also sought to advance the status and aspirations of Maori. Unfortunately, this domestic component of cultural diplomacy has been largely neglected in scholarly accounts. Whether governments other than New Zealand and Canada have also tried to pursue similar domestic goals through cultural diplomacy would be a worthy subject for comparative study.

Biographical Note

Simon Mark is an adviser on public diplomacy for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His research interests are the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand and Canada, the link between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy's connection to, and role in, national branding.

89 It is important to emphasize that despite Higham's 'great hopes' for cultural diplomacy to contribute to domestic objectives, even before the most recent cuts to Canada's federal diplomacy, he was strongly critical of the lack of support provided to Canada's federal cultural diplomacy.